Insurance: Legal and Practical Problems Arising from Subrogation Clauses in Health and Accident Policies by Capwell, Rex & Greenwald, Thomas E.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 3 Summer 1971 Article 1
Insurance: Legal and Practical Problems Arising
from Subrogation Clauses in Health and Accident
Policies
Rex Capwell
Thomas E. Greenwald
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Rex Capwell and Thomas E. Greenwald, Insurance: Legal and Practical Problems Arising from Subrogation Clauses in Health and Accident
Policies, 54 Marq. L. Rev. 255 (1971).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol54/iss3/1
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Vol. 54 SUMMER, 1971 No. 3
LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
ARISING FROM SUBROGATION
CLAUSES IN HEALTH AND
ACCIDENT POLICIES
By REx CAPWELL* AND THOMAS E. GREENWALD'*
I. INTRODUCTION
II. VALIDITY OF SUBROGATION PROVISIONS
A. Subrogation clause held invalid.
B. Subrogation clause held valid.
C. Medical payments set-off from liability.
III. AGAINST WHOM CAN THE INSURER PROCEED TO RECOVER
PAYMENTS MADE To ITS INSURED.
A. Tortfeasor or the insured.
B. Other Insurance.
IV. DIVISION OF PROCEEDS BETWEEN SUBROGATED INSURER AND
CLAIMANT.
V. RIGHT OF ATTORNEY TO COLLECT FEES FROM SUBROGATED
INSURER.
VI. DIVISION OF PROCEEDS WHERE MULTIPLE SUBROGATED
INSURERS SEEK RECOVERY.
VII. MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article explores the legal and practical probems of recoupment
under insurance policy subrogation clauses.
Black defines the term "subrogation" as:
A legal fiction through which a person who, not as a volunteer or
in his own wrong, and in the absence of outstanding and
superior equities, pays a debt of another, is substituted to all
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consin (Board of Governors, 1966-70) ; A.B.A., Board of Directors Insurance
Trial Counsel of Wisconsin; Lecturer in Law and Insurance, Dominican
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1970.
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rights and remedies of the other, and the debt is treated in
equity as still existing for his benefit, and the doctrine is broad
enough to include every instance in which one party pays the
debt for which another is primarily answerable ....
This article discusses the following questions:
1. Is a subrogation clause in an insurance policy or a medical expense
plan valid?
2. Against whom can the insurer proceed to recover payments made
to its insured?
a. The tortfeasor or the insured;
b. Other insurers;
(1) Liability carriers;
(2) Other carriers providing similar first party benefits, in-
cluding Uninsured Motorist carriers.
3. How are proceeds divided between:
a. Subrogated party and claimant;
b. Multiple subrogated parties.
4. How are proceeds divided where:
a. comparative negligence has been adopted
b. contributory negligence bars recovery
c. available proceeds are inadequate.
5. What are the rights of an attorney to collect fees from a subro-
gated party where he obtains recovery for his injured client and
the subrogated party?
6. What problems arise when court approval of the settlement is
required ?
Various types of insurance policies offer "first party" benefits with
subrogation provisions. The benefits are offered in a Health and Acci-
dent policy and in prepaid medical plans such as "Blue Cross-Blue
Shield." The benefits are also often found in liability package policies
such as: Family Combination Automobile Insurance, Homeowner's
Policy-Renter's Insurance, 'Comprehensive Personal Lia:bility Insur-
ance and certain Business Owner's policies.
In Health and Accident policies compensation to an injured insured
is the essence of the contract. However, in automobile liability policies,
fire insurance policies, and homeowner's insurance a medical expense
provision is generally included as an incentive to purchase. These
policies may or may not include a subrogation clause, but inclusion of
subrogation clauses is on the increase. The desire to eliminate double
recoveries is a natural response to the public's demand for lower costs
and faster payouts. The automobile policy contains two basic agreements
providing "Expenses for Medical Services" and are added to the com-
I BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY (4th ed. 1957) at 1595.
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mon fire and liability policies in order to attract policyholders or for
more subtle ends.
2
The provision providing for subrogation in the event of payment is
not always found where the first party benefits are provided. Some of
the prepaid plans do include subrogation provisions. However, it has
been the exception rather than the rule.
Because "subrogation" has only recently gained in popularity, much
of the law is unsettled. Only several of the problem areas mentioned
above have been examined by enough jurisdictions to find a trend or a
general rule. However, the courts are not distinguishing cases on the
basis of the nature of the particular policy, that is, whether or not the
policy or contract in issue is a health policy, a prepaid medical plan, or a
family automobile liability policy. As a result, while many of the cases
discussed in this article arose out of a Medical Payments provision in
an automobile insurance policy, the rules would be the same for health
and accident insurance or prepaid medical plans.
II VALIDITY OF SUBROGATION PROVISIONS.
The right of subrogation generally can only be claimed where the
policy specifically provides for such. However, in addition to the specific
provision, payments will rarely be made to an insured under a medical
payments endorsement until the insured acknowledges the right of the
carrier to be subrogated to his interest.3 Such acknowledgement usually
takes one of three forms: (1) subrogation agreement; (2) "trust"
agreement; or (3) a "loan receipt" agreement. The first merely pro-
vides that the insured's rights against any third party, to the extent
payment has been made, pass to the insurer. The "trust" agreement
generally states that the insured shall retain as a trust for the benefit of
the insurer an amount received by the insured from any party liable to
him for his injuries to the extent of the medical payments made by the
insurer.4 The "loan receipt" states that the sum which the insurer
expends for the insured's medical expenses is considered to be a loan
2For instance, the "MNedical Payments" and "Uninsured Motorist" protection
plans included in the Standard Family Combination Automobile Policy are in
part a response and alternative to the demands for "no fault" automobile in-
surance. See Pouros, Melendes, and Craig, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 445, 446-47 (1969)
and 53 MARQ. L. l~v. 320, 323-24 (1970).
3 Smith v. Motor Club of America Ins. Co., 54 N.J. 37, 148 A.2d 37 (1959);
aff'd 56 N.J. Super. 203, 152 A. 2d 369 (1959) ; cert. denied, 30 N.J. 563, 154
A.2d 451 (1959); Davenport v. State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 81 Nev.
361, 404 P.2d 10 (1965) ; Geertz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 451, P.2d 860(Ore. 1969).
4 Subrogation in Medical Service Plans and Medical Insurance Policies, 12
PERSONAL INJURY COMMENTATOR 147, 150 (1969); Miller v. Liberty Mutual
Fire Ins. Co., 48 Misc.2d 102, 264 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1965) aff'd 289 N.Y.S.2d
276 (1968).
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which is to be repaid only if the insured recovers from a party liable to
him for his injuries.5
In essence, all three are merely another subrogation agreement,
which cannot exist without the existence of the typical subrogation
clause in the original contract, since no separate consideration is given
in return for the agreement to subrogate. However, some courts do
distinguish the cases on the basis of the subsequent agreement form.
The issue of the validity of a subrogation clause, like most legal
issues, finds its way into the courts in a wide variety of factual settings.
Some of the more common are:
1. An insurer, having paid its insured's medical expenses, may
attempt to recover them directly from the tortfeasor or his insurer ;6
2. An insurer, having paid its insured's medical expenses and having
notified the tortfeasor's liability carrier of its subrogation claim,
sues the liability carrier where it ignores the subrogation claim and
makes a settlement with the injured insured which includes an
amount for the medical expenses of the injured party ;'
3. An insurer may sue its insured for sums expended when the in-
sured, in violation of the subrogation agreement, settles with the
tortfeasor or his liability carrier, thereby destroying the insurer's
right of subogation ;$
4. An insured, having negotiated a settlement with or obtained a
judgment against a tortfeasor, which included an amount for
medical expenses, sues his insurer for the same expenses and
seeks to have the subrogation provision declared void as against
public policy ;9
5. An insured may sue his insurer for medical expense payments
when the carrier has refused to make such payments until the
5 For a discussion of loan receipts see 16 Coucce ON INsuRAN c (2d) § 61:72-90
(1966) ; See also Courtney v. Birdsong, 437 S.W.2d 238 (Ark. 1968) ; Geertz
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 451 P.2d 860 (Ore. 1969); National Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 278 Minn. 45, 153 N.W.2d 152 (1967); Wilson v.
Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Tenn. 560, 411 S.W.2d 699 (1966).
G Lowder v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 436 P.2d 654 (Okla. 1967);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lutz, 3 Ohio Misc. 144, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 469, 210 N.E.2d
755 (1964).
7 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Farmer Ins. Exchange, 22 Utah 2d 183,
450 P.2d 458 (1969) ; Association Hosp. Service, Inc. v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut.
Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 170, 147 N.W.2d 225 (1967); Davenport v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 81 Nev. 361, 404 P.2d 10 (1965).
s National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 278 Minn. 45, 153 N.W.2d 152 (1967);
Hospital Service Corp. of R.I. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105 (R.I.
1967); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ritz, 70 Wash. 2d 317, 422 P.2d 780
(1967); Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lea, 2 Ariz. App. 538, 410 P.2d 495
(1966); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. Ct. App.
1965); Michigan Medical Service v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713(1954).
9 Wilson v. Tennessee Farmers Ins. Co., 219 Tenn. 560, 411 S.W. 2d 699 (1967);
Miller v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 48 Misc. 2d 102, 264 N.Y.S.2d 319
(1965).
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insured executes an agreement subrogating the insurer to the pro-
ceeds of any recovery which the insured may obtain; and10
6. An insured may sue his insurer for medical payments when the
carrier has refused to make such payment because the insured has
settled with and released the tortfeasor, prejudicing the insurer's
subrogations rights."
The issue of the validity of the subrogation provision has been
decided, either directly or indirectly in 32 jurisdictions in the United
States. Of the 32 jurisdictions, 26 have held that the provision is valid,
while only six jurisdictions have held the provision invalid for one of
several reasons.'
2
A. Subrogation clause held invalid.
Six states (Arizona, California, Georgia, Missouri, Oklahoma, and
Virginia)' 3 hold that an insurer may not rely on its subrogation clause
in any dispute concerning payments made to an insured or claimed to be
owing an insured to compensate him for personal injury suffered as a
result of the negligent acts of a third person. Of the six, two have re-
stricted its use by statute, the other four jurisdictions have done so by
common law.
Subrogation provisions have been invalidated on the theory that the
common law prohibits the assignment of a cause of action for a personal
injury claim, or the splitting of a cause of action for personal injuries.
These reasons have not 'been uniformly accepted, and have been
discarded in favor of the development of compensation plans which
more readily compensate the accident victim. However, the minority
view has some points worth consideration by anyone interested in the
reform of our present system of compensation.
Travelers Indemnity Company v. Chumbley14 is typical of the reason-
ing in the opinions which have held that the typical subrogation clause
in a medical payments policy or contract for services is invalid because
it is an assignment of a personal injury claim. In Chumbley the plain-
tiff-insurer had paid a portion of its insured's medical, surgical and
hospital expenses under a medical payments endorsement contained in
a family automobile insurance policy. The insured had sustained serious
10 Demmery v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 210 Pa. Super, 193, 232 A.2d 21
(1967) ; Peller v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 610, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 41 (1963).
"3 Shipley v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 244 Ark. 1159, 428 S.W.2d 268 (1968);
Bush v. Home Ins. Co., 97 N.J. Super. 54, 234 A.2d 250 (1967); De Cespedes
v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966); Wrightsman
v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 306, 147 S.E.2d 280(1966); Bernardini v. Home and Auto. Ins. Co., 64 Ill. App. 2d 465, 212
N.E.2d 499 (1966) ; Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 309, 145 S.E.2d
845 (1966).
'
2 See Appendix A.
13 Id.
14394 S.W.2d 418, 19 A.L.R.3d 1043 (Mo. App. 1965).
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injuries, including the amputation of his right leg at the knee when he
attempted to prevent an unoccupied vehicle from rolling down a hill in a
heavily traveled thoroughfare. Chumbley, the injured party, subsequently
'brought suit against the owner of the runaway vehicle. The suit was dis-
missed with prejudice under stipulation, after Chumbley had settled out
of court. Subsequent to making its payment, but prior to the dismissal
of Chumbley's action, the carrier notified the owner of the runaway
vehicle of its subrogation rights under its policy issued to Chumbley.
After the carrier discovered the settlement reached by Chumbley, he
brought suit against Chumbley and against the owner. The actions were
dismissed on the defendant's motions for summary judgment. On
appeal, the trial court's ruling was affirmed. Justice Stone, in writing
the opinion, stated that Missouri case law prohibited the assignment, in
whole or in part, of a cause of action. He went on to state that medical
expenses, as distinguished from property damage, is an integral part
of an injured party's personal injury claim, and as such, not assignable.
The opinion relied upon an older California case holding that an in-
surer's alleged right to be subrogated to medical payments coverage
afforded by an automobile policy, constituted an assignment of a cause
of action for personal injuries. However, the court felt duty bound to
expand its reasons for invalidating the subrogation clause:
(I)nsuring against expenses payable under automobile "medical
payments" coverage ... has become so "useful and widespread"
that many, if not most, of those who carry automobile medical
payments coverage also have other coverage of some character
(e.g., coverage under hospital and medical service plans such as
Blue Cross and Blue Shield ... ) designed to pay . . . some or all
of the expenses payable under automobile medical payments
coverage.
If some automobile insurers making the subrogation "condition"
in their policies applicable to medical payments coverage were to
obtain judicial approval thereof, no doubt all such insurers
would, in due course, similarly condition their policies. And, if
automobile insurers were to insist upon subrogation as to medical
payments coverage, others affording coverage against all or some
of the same expenses logically would be justified in insisting
upon subrogation. .. Thus the nurturing of subrogation as to
medical payments would give substance to the unwelcome
spector of multiple subrogation claims . . . (which) would lead
to conflicts and 'disputes . . . would encourage and promote
suits and interpleaders, all running counter to the policy of the
law.1 5
15 Id. at 424. 19 A.L.R.3d at 1052-53. See also Forsthove v. Hardware Dealers
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. App. 1967) where the court added
that because the gist of damages in personal injury cases were for physical
and mental pain, they should not be the subject of barter or trade-a matter
of profit to the injured party's creditors.
(The following cases, in addition to Chunibley and Forsthove, have held
that a subrogation clause in a contract providing medical expenses to its in-
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The subrogation provision has also 'been invalidated on the ground
that it violates the common law rule against the splitting of a cause of
action. In Lowder v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Com-
pany,16 an insurer, having paid the medical expenses of its insured after
he was injured in an automobile accident, brought suit against the
alleged third party tortfeasor. The insurer alleged that it had a right to
reimbursement from the tortfeasor as a subrogated party, having ob-
tained its subrogation rights under an express provision in the auto-
mobile policy it had issued to the injured party. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court, in overruling a judgment for the insured, pointed out that a
single tort to a single person only gave rise to one cause of action. Since
the insured had not yet brought a claim against the tortfeasor for the
recovery of personal injuries or property damage, permitting the in-
surer to bring a separate action to recover the medical expenses would
violate the common law rule against the splitting of a single cause of
action.
7
Virginia, 8 CaliforniaP9 and Georgia" have passed statutes restrict-
sured on no-fault basis is invalid as an attempted assignment of a cause of
action for personal injuries: Fifield M[anor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 354 P.2d 1073 (1970) ; Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lea, 2 Ariz.
App. 538, 410 P.2d 495 (1966); Wrightsman v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 147 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. App. 1966); Peller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 41 (Ct. of App. 1963).(See also, Annot., Subrogation Rights of Insurer Under Medical Payments
Provision of Automobile Insurance Policy, 19 A.L.R.3d, 1054 (1968); V.
Rogers, Insurance Subrogation in Auto Medical Payments Coverage, 19
CLEVELAND STATE L. REV. 393 (1970); Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule
and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1478, 1547 (1968) [sup-
porting contentions similar to those voiced by Justice Stone in Chumbley].
"3436 P.2d 654 (Okla. 1967). But see Hospital Service Corp. of R.I. v. Pennsyl-
vania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105 (R.I. 1967). In this case the injured party was
paid by Hospital Service and then settled with the liability insurer of the
tortfeasor. The settlement was entered into even though the liability carrier
had notice of the subrogation claim of Hospital Service. The court, in a
suit commenced by Hospital Service against its subscriber, the tortfeasor and
the liability carrier, held that since the defendants participated in the settle-
ment with full knowledge of the plaintiff's claim, they were held to have
acquiesed in the splitting of the subscriber's original cause of action.
17 It should be noted that there was no evidence before the court establishing
whether or not the insured did in fact still possess a good cause of action
against the tortfeasor. Actually, the insured had previously settled all claims
he had and executed a release which contained a specific reservation relative
to the medical expenses incurred by the insured and paid by the insurer. Risjord-
Austin, 5 Automobile Liability Insurance Cases 6045 (1969).
'
8 VA. CODE ANNoT. § 38.1-381.2 (1970). Automobile liability medical benefit in-
surer not to retain right of subrogation to recover from third party.-On and
after January one, nineteen hundred sixty-five no policy or contract of bodily
injury liability insurance, or of property damage liability insurance, which
contains any representation by an insurance company that such company
will pay all reasonable medical expense incurred for bodily injury caused
by accident to the insured or any relative or other person coming within
the provisions thereof, shall be issued or delivered by any insurer licensed
in this State upon any motor vehicle then principally garaged or principally
used in this State, if such insurer retains the right of subrogation to recover
all amounts paid on behalf of an injured person under the provision of the
policy from any third party. (1964, c. 612.)
10 ANNOT. CALIF. CODE, Probate § 573.
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ing the use of subrogation by insurance carriers. Virginia had pre-
viously implied in Moorman v. Nationwide llutual Insurance Company,21
that an insurer could be subrogated to the rights of its insured against
a third party tortfeasor to recover for the medical expenses it had paid
to its insured if such was provided for under the medical payments
endorsement. In Moorman, the injured party had settled with the tort-
feasor and his liability carrier, Nationwide, for his personal injuries
and medical expenses. The injured party then brought a separate action
against Nationwide under the same policy, contending that as a pas-
senger of the tortfeasor's vehicle, he was entitled to benefits under the
medical payments endorsement, which he alleged was separately con-
tracted for by the tortfeasor and a separate premium was charged by
Nationwide to the tortfeasor, and that the injured passenger was a third
party beneficiary of such contract. There was no provision specifically
permitting the insurer to set-off payments made under its liability
endorsement from the amount due a passenger under the medical pay-
ments endorsement, or vice-versa.
The Virginia Supreme Court held that each endorsement was a
separate contract for the benefit of third parties, and permitted the
insured to recover in the second action, notwithstanding the prior
settlement. The court went on to state the following, implying that set-
offs and subrogation provisions would be valid and controlling if in-
cluded in the contracts:
The insurance contract was prepared by Nationwide. Had it
intended to limit or reduce the amount of its liability for medical
payments under Coverage "G", if other medical payments were
available to the injured person under any other coverage of its
policy, or from another source, it could easily have so provided.
22
Any attempt to use this language to support the validity of a subro-
gation contract has been precluded by the Virginia legislature by the
adoption of § 38.1-381.2 in 1968. That section expressly prohibits the
incorporation of a subrogation provision in medical expense coverage.23
California, whose statute theoretically invalidates subrogation pro-
visions has followed a peculiar course in several decisions. In two cases,
20 GA. CODE ANNOT., Title 85 § 1805 What not assignable. A right of action is
assignable if it involves, directly or indirectly, a right of property; but a
right of action for personal torts or for injuries arising from fraud to the
assignor may not be assigned.
In Wrightsman v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 306,
147 S.E.2d 860, 861 (1966), the Court held that the standard subrogation
clause included in the Medical Expense endorsement of an automobile in-
surance policy "amounted to no more than an agreement to assign a personal
injury claim in the event of payment under the terms of the medical pay-
ments coverage of the policy of insurance." As such, it was void because pro-
hibited by statute.
21 148 S.E.2d 874 (Va. 1966).
22 Id. at 876.
23 See note 18 supra, for text of statute.
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Fifield Manor v. Finston24 and Peller v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance
Company,25 the courts struck down an "assignment of proceeds" and an
"assignment of a right to recovery to the extent of payments made" on
the basis that both were essentially subrogation provisions which were
prohibited by statute. However, in cases where the insured could
assure himself of a double recovery, the courts had a different view.
In Doods v. Bucknum, 26 the injured party, a passenger in the alleged
tortfeasor's automobile, received payments under the driver's family
combination automobile policy-medical payments endorsement, and
then brought suit against the tortfeasor which included a claim for
medical expenses. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was not
entitled to a double recovery since the collateral source rule was in-
applicable where the collateral source was generated by the tortfeasor.
In a subsequent district court case, Cannizzo v. Guarantee Insur-
ance Company,27 it was held that double recovery by the injured party
would be prohibited where the medical payments endorsement provided
a set-off from any amounts the company would be liable for under the
liability provisions of the same policy.
Another extension of the "double recovery" prohibition was
achieved in a decision rendered by the Superior Court for Los Angeles
County in Syne Tryper v. Merit Plan Insurance Company.28 In that
case the court upheld a "reimbursement plan" whereby an insurer
agreed to advance medical payments, but its ultimate liability to pay the
medical expenses became fixed only in the event that the injured insured
would be unable to recover such expenditures from the third-party
tortfeasor.
(P)ossibilities of double recovery posed by this case and those
similar to it constitute inequities against good conscience to which
the court should not shut its eyes ... One ought to seek to be
made whole, but not enriched through an automobile acci-
dent.. 29
medical service contract issued by a nonprofit organization, which,
under the Statutes of California, was declared not to be an insurance
business.
The most interesting decision which apparently diminishes the
effect of the California Statute is Block v. California Physicians" Service,
Inc. 30 This case involved a "reimbursement" provision in a prepaid
2454 Cal. 2d 632, 7 Cal. Rptr. 337, 354 P.2d 1073 (1960).
2534 Cal. Rptr. 41 (Ct. App. 1963).
26 214 Cal. App. 2d 206, 29 Cal. Rptr. 393 (Ct. App. 1965).
2753 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1966).
2 8 Tryper v. Merit Plan Ins. Co., L.A. County Super. Ct., App. Dept. [Civ. No.
11085] (1965) [P., F. & M. Analysis Service, Current Court Decisions (Feb.
1966)1.
29 Id.
30 53 Cal. Rptr. 51 (Ct. App. 1966).
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medical service contract issued by a nonprofit organization, which under
the Statutes of California, was declared not to be an insurance business.
The contract provided that if the member was injured by a third-
party tortfeasor, then the service pays medical benefits on the condi-
tion that the member agrees in writing:
(1) to reimburse CPS to the extent of benefits provided, im-
mediately upon collection of damages by him, whether by
action at law, settlement or otherwise, and
(2) to provide CPS with a lien, to the extent of benefits pro-
vided by CPS. The lien may be filed with the person whose
act caused the injuries, his agent, or the court.3 1
The member said that such provisions were void under §956 of the
Civil Code (§573 of the Probate Code) as a transfer of a cause of
action. He contended that these provisions had been held invalid in the
Peller32 decision. However, the court distinguished this case from Peller
in two respects. In Peller these provisions appeared under the heading
"Subrogation", while the CPS did not mention that term. The court
also stated that the CPS provisions did not constitute a subrogation
clause because the Service could not force the member to take any action
against the tortfeasor-those rights generally being provided for in the
standard subrogation provision in a medical payments endorsement of
an insurance policy. 33
B. Subrogation clause held valid.
Without question the majority of the jurisdictions which have either
directly or indirectly considered the validity of a clause which would
permit an insurer to have a right to recoup its payments where the
injuries suffered by an insured were caused by negligent acts of a third
party, have held that such a clause is valid. 4 The courts have given
various reasons for upholding the validity of the clauses, the most
significant of which are as follows:
1. Subrogation provisions merely constitute conventional subroga-
tion which does not constitute an assignment of a cause of action;
2. Present conditions in society command that the old common law
rule prohibiting the assignment of a cause of action for personal
injuries be repealed in favor of permitting such an assignment;
3. Subrogation provisions do not constitute an assignment of a
cause of action, but rather impress a lien in favor of the party
providing the benefits, to the extent that that party has made
31 Id. at 52.
32 Peller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 41.
33 This may be the one case found where the type of contract changes the rule
in regard to the validity of subrogation of an essential subrogation provision
permitting the party providing the benefits some type of reimbursement from
the tortfeasor. The court did stress the point that the contract in this case
was for services, not indemnity.
• 4 For a list of jurisdictions which have considered this issue, and for the re-
sults therein, see Appendix A.
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payment, on the proceeds of any recovery obtained by the in-
sured from the tortfeasor;
4. The right of subrogation, where provided for in a contract, is
neither unfair nor over-reaching, and therefore should be given
effect (some decisions highlight the fact that there is in fact an
accompanying reduced premium);
5. The right of subrogation, where provided for in a contract cannot
be considered contrary to public policy in the absence of action
by the insurance department, which is vested, by the legislature,
with duties concerning the approval of insurance policies.
Apparently one of the most popular reasons given for upholding a
subrogation provision permitting the insurer or medical service plan to
recoup, directly or indirectly, its payments is that such a subrogation
clause constitutes pure and simple subrogation which can be and is
distinguished from an assignment of a cause of action. De Cespedes
v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Company,3 5 perhaps explains the reason-
ing of the courts in the clearest manner. In De Cespedes an insured
under an automobile policy which contained a medical payment provi-
sion brought an action against the insurer to recover for his medical
expenses. Prior to bringing the suit the insured had settled with the
third party tortfeasor and had executed a full release. The medical pay-
ments provision of the insured's automobile policy contained 'the stand-
ard subrogation clause, which included a provision that the insured
"shall do nothing after loss to prejudice (the insurer's subrogation)
rights." On the 'basis of that provision, the 'trial court granted the de-
fendant insurer's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal the insured attacked the validity of the subrogation pro-
visions arguing that the subrogation clause in fact constituted an attempt
to assign a claim for personal injuries which was invalid under the
common law and had not been altered by any statute. The court of
appeals rejected such argument holding -that the concept of subrogation
was distinct from an assignment of a cause of action. Subrogation, ex-
plained the court, is a concept in equity adopted for the purpose of
obtaining an equitable adjustment between the parties by securing the
ultimate discharge of a debt by the person who in equity and good
conscience is responsible to pay it.
Under the doctrine of subrogation the insurer is substituted, by
operation of law, to the rights of the insured . . . It is not avail-
able to a volunteer, only to one under a duty to pay ... By con-
tract, an assignment generally refers to or connotes a voluntary
act of transferring an interest ...
35 193 So. 2d 224 (Fla. App. 1967); aff'd 202 So. 2d 561 (1967).
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(S)o long as subrogation as applied to this medical provision
serves to bar double recovery, it should be upheld.36
Rather than distinguish subrogation from assignment, several courts
have merely abrogated the old common law rule prohibiting the assign-
ment of a cause of action for personal injuries.37 In Davenport v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,38 the medical payments
carrier prevailed in a suit against the tortfeasor and his insurer who
had settled with the injured party who had previously been reimbursed
for his medical expenses by the plaintiff. The tortfeasor and his in-
surer settled all claims with the injured party, notwithstanding the out-
standing claim for medical payments made by the carrier against the
defendants. The case was submitted on stipulated facts and was designed
to test the validity of the subrogation provisions of the plaintiff's policy.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the modern rule in regard to
assignment of a cause of action is that if the cause of action would
survive the death of the person injured, as a cause of action for personal
injury does, then that right is assignable. Therefore, a provision in a
contract for medical payments which subrogates the company, to the
extent of the medical payments made by it to the insured, to the rights
of the injured party against the tortfeasor or those responsible for his
negligent acts is valid.
Another method used by the courts to circumvent the common law
rule prohibiting the assignment of interests has been to declare that the
subrogation clause cannot operate to transfer the cause of action; how-
ever, it can operate to impress a lien in favor of the insurer or organiza-
tion providing the benefits upon any recovery by the insured from the
tortfeasor.
Illinois has followed -this reasoning in two cases, Damhesel v.
Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 9 and Bernardini
v. Home and Automobile Insurance Company.40 Both cases involved
36 Ido, at 227; See also State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers' Ins. Exchange, 22
Utah 2d 183, 450 P.2d 458 (1969); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Rader, 166
S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1969); Shipley v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 244 Ark.
1159, 428 S.W.2d 268 (1968) ; Miller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.., 48 Misc.
2d 1021, 264 N.Y.S.2d 319, affd 289 N.Y.S. (1968); Bradford v. American
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 25 Pa. Super. 8, 245 A.2d 478 (1968) following Demmery
v. National Fire Ins. Co., 210 Pa. Super. 193, 232 A.2d 21 (1967); Busch v.
Home Ins. Co., 97 N.J. Super. 54, 234 A.2d 250 (1967); Wilson v. Tennes-
see Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Tenn. 560, 411 S.W.2d 699 (1967) ; Anderson
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 309, 145 S.E.2d 845 (1966) ; Damhesel v. Hard-
ware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 60 Ill. App. 2d 279, 209 N.E.2d 877 (1965).3 Davenport v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 81 Nev. 361, 404 P.2d 10 (1965);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lutz, 3 Ohio Misc. 144, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 469, 210 N.E.2d
755 (Mun. Ct. 1964).
38 81 Nev. 361, 404 P.2d 10 (1965).
39 60 Ill. App. 2d 279, 209 N.E.2d 877 (1965).
4064 Ill. App. 2d 465, 212 N.E.2d 499 (1965) ; See also Miller v. Liberty Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 48 Misc. 2d 102, 264 N.Y.S. 2d 319 (Spec. T. 1965), aff'd 289
N.Y.S.2d 276 (1968).
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suits by the insured under the medical payments provision of his auto-
mobile insurance policy to recover for medical expenses where he had
already settled with the tortfeasor and had executed a full release.
Notwithstanding the existence of the old common law rule against
assignments, several decisions have held that the right of the insurer to
be reimbursed to the extent of payments made or to be subrogated to
the rights of its insured is based on a contractual right and that such
contractual provisions are not unfair nor over-reaching, and often times
are accompanied by an appropriately reduced premium.
In National Union Fire Insurance Company v. Grimes41 the in-
surer brought suit against its insured for medical payments reimburse-
ment from proceeds of settlement made -by the insured with the tort-
feasor and his liability carrier. The policy issued to the defendant in-
sured did not contain the so-called "reimbursement" clause nor had the
insured executed any "reimbursement agreement" or "trust agreement"
when accepting the payments from the plaintiff. However, the policy
did contain the following subrogation provision:
In the event of any payment under the medical expense coverage
of this policy, the company shall be subrogated to all the rights
of recovery therefore which the injured person or anyone receiv-
ing such payment may have against any person or organization
and such person shall execute and deliver instruments and papers
and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. Such
person shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights.4 2
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in reversing the judgment for the
insured entered in the trial court, stated:
Here the insurer is making a claim for reimbursement as against
the insured . . . upon the ground that the contract obligates the
defendant to repay the insurer if and vhen he recovers from the
person who caused the damage. .. It is clear that the intendment
of the contract is to that effect. We do not see any consideration
of public policy which precludes the making of such an agree-
ment.
The . . . defendant wished to obtain a policy of automobile
liability insurance with medical payment coverage at a premium
lower than that generally available. It seems reasonable to assume
that the subrogation provision contained in this policy could
result in the reduced premium. We think that unless there is a
clear public policy to the contrary, a prospective insured should
be free to secure insurance at the lowest possible premium avail-
able for the kind of coverage that satisfies him.43
The same philosophy was used by the Michigan Supreme Court in
Michigan Medical Service v. Sharpe,44 a case which involved a pre-
paid medical service contract:
41278 Minn. 45, 153 N.W.2d 152 (1967).
42 Id., 153 N.W.2d at 153.
43 Id., 153 N.W.2d at 155.
44339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713 (1954); See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1177 (1955).
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The contentions of the defendant Sharpe are that to allow re-
covery by the plaintiff . .. "would mean permitting it to receive
premiums without any obligations . . ." Enrichment of plaintiff
is not unjust if pursuant to the express agreement of the parties,
fairly and honestly arrived at . . . To agree with the defendant
that the subrogation clause gave the plaintiff no rights whatso-
ever is to read it out of the agreement by rendering it meaning-
less. This a court may not do.45
Other jurisdictions have also ignored the common law rule prohibit-
ing assignments and have given effect to the contractual agreement
based on the fact that the state insurance commission had approved the
form of the policy in issue. For example, in Smith v. Motor Club of
America Insurance Company,46 an insured, having settled with the tort-
feasor for an amount including medical expenses, brought suit against
his insurer seeking to have the policy reformed by having the subroga-
tion clause deleted, and then recovering his medical expenses under the
medical payments provision. The insured alleged that the subrogation
provision was illegal, void and against public policy. However, the
court, in granting summary judgment for the insurer, held that the
provision was presumed neither unfair, inequitable nor against public
policy since the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance, who was
vested with legislative authority to strike from any policy any clauses
he deemed to be unfair or inequitable, took no action with respect to
subrogation provisions applying to a medical payment endorsement in
automobile insurance policies.
In at least two decisions the court examined all the reasons adopted
by other courts in upholding the subrogation agreements, and without
specifically adopting any one reason declared that the insurer may
validly contract to pay medical expenses to an insured and then be sub-
rogated to the insured's rights against a third party tortfeasor, to the
extent of the payments made.
4 7
45 Michigan Medical Service v. Sharpe, 64 N.W.2d at 714. See also Sentry Ins.
Co. v. Stuart, 439 S.W.2d 797 (Ark. 1969). While Arkansas has continued
to uphold the rights of subrogation by a company under a Medical Expense
endorsement, it has continued to hold that a personal injury claim is not as-
signable. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wright Oil Co., 454 S.W.2d
69 (Ark. 1970); Motto v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 462 P.2d 620 (N.M.
1969) [Because workmen's compensation cases permitted assignment of a
cause of action, the court could not see any valid reason for holding subro-
gation provisions against public policy] ; Silinsky v. State-Wide Ins. Co., 289
N.Y.S.2d 541 (App. Div. 1968) ; Hospital Ser. Corp. of R.I. v. Pennsylvania
Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105 (R.I. 1967) ; Associated Hospital Service, Inc. v. Mil-
waukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 170, 147 N.W.2d 225 (1967).
4654 N.J. Super. 37, 148 A.2d 37 (1959) ; aff'd 56 N.J. Super. 203, 152 A.2d 369
(1959) ; certification denied, 30 N.J. 563, 154 A.2d 451 (1959). For a criticism
of this case see Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. App.
1965). See also Busch v. Home Ins. Co., 97 N.J. Super. 54, 234 A.2d 250
(1967); Bernardini v. Home and Auto. Ins. Co., 64 Ill. App. 2d 465, 212
N.E.2d 499 (1966); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lutz, 3 Ohio Misc. 144, 32 Ohio
Op. 2d 469, 210 N.E.2d 755 (1964).
47Geertz v. Satte Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 451 P.2d 860 (Ore. 1969); Higgins v.
Allied American Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 237 A.2d 471 (D.C. 1968).
[Vol. 54
SUBROGATION CLAUSES
While subrogation is an equitable right, subrogation must be pro-
vided for in the contract or policy. This rule is emphatically brought
out in two companion cases brought before the Michigan Supreme
Court-Michigan Hospital Service v. Sharpe,4" and another case by the
same name.49 In both suits the hospital service brought suit against the
subscriber to recover payments made to the subscriber who, subsequent
to receiving the services, settled with the tortfeasor and executed a full
release of all claims against the tortfeasor.
In the first suit the contract in issue did not contain any subrogation
or similar provisions, while in the second suit the contract did contain
an express subrogation clause. The majority opinion in the first case
held that the service was primarily liable for the medical expenses
incurred by the subscriber and therefore was not entitled to recover
on the basis of common law or equitable principles of subrogation, from
the subscriber, who had obtained a settlement from the third party
tortfeasor which included an amount for medical expenses.
Justice Dethmers, who dissented to the ruling in the first case, was
the author of the opinion in the companion case. In the opinion Justice
Dethmers stated that the earlier decision stressed, as a reason for the
result, the absence of a subrogation clause in the contract or "certifi-
cate." The court found the provisions to be valid and not against public
policy.50 In concluding the opinion Justice Dethmers states:
In view of the holding in the companion case, liability, if any, to
plaintiff here, can be predicated only upon the subrogation clause
in the agreement. 51
The leading case establishing the Wisconsin position is Associated
Hospital Service v. Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Company.5 2 In
that case, Associated Hospital Service (AHS), a Blue Cross service
plan organization, had paid the hospital and medical care expenses of its
subscriber, Josephine Opine. Miss Opine had been injured in an auto-
mobile accident caused by the negligence of Arthur Sievers, who was
insured by the Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Company (Milwau-
kee). AHS, after paying the medical expenses of Miss Opine, notified
Milwaukee that, pursuant to its contract with Mrs. Opine, it had
acquired a subrogation right against Milwaukee and its insured to the
extent of the medical payments made. Milwaukee settled with Mrs.
Opine for her damages, which included a sum for her medical expenses,
however, no payment was made to AHS. AHS then brought suit against
48339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d 638 (1954).
19 Michigan Med. Ser. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713 (1954); See
Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1177 (1955).
50 Supra, footnote 45.51 M ichigan Med. Service v. Sharpe, 64 N.W2d at 714.5233 Wis. 2d 170, 147 N.W.2d 225 (1967).
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the liability carrier in an attempt to recover for the hospitalization and
medical payments it had made to Mrs. Opine.
The case was one of first impression in Wisconsin. The court, in a
well written opinion, noted that the leading decision in Wisconsin on
subrogation under accident insurance policies, Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee
Electric Railway and Light Co.,53 denied that a contract of casualty
insurance was one of indemnity where there was no expressed stipula-
tion to the contrary, but did say that "the parties might give it that
character by a stipulation to that effect." 54
The court was impressed by the fact that the subrogation provision
in the AHS contract was aimed at avoiding duplication of coverage,
was accompanied by an appropriately reduced premium, and was re-
viewable by the state Insurance Commissioner. It therefore decided to
follow the majority of jurisdictions in upholding and enforcing an ex-
press agreement for subrogation.
C. Medical Payments Set Off from Liability.
When a liability carrier reimburses the insured for his medical
expenses the company may then attempt to deduct that amount from
the liability award. The typical set-off provision has been upheld as be-
ing valid notwithstanding the argument that the medical payments pro-
vision and the liability provision of the policy are separate provisions
with separate premiums. This is an argument which -is sometimes made
in relation to the validity of the subrogation agreement and the treatment
by the courts relating to the set-off provision may shed some light on
how those jurisdictions would react if the validity of the subrogation
provision of the medical payments clause was challenged.
In Yarrington v. Thornburg56 the defendant driver sought allow-
ance of credit after judgment for the payments previously made to his
injured passenger under the medical expense provision of his liability
insurance policy. The court, in an effort to avoid permitting double
recovery by the injured passenger, permitted the credit to be made. The
decision was based upon the court's conclusion that the collateral source
rule, as applicable in Delaware, is not applicable where the collateral
source is generated by the tortfeasor.
53136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W. 633 (1908).
54 Id. at 38, 116 N.W. at 634.
55 A typical provision is as follows: "The Company may pay the insured person
or any person or organization rendering the services and such payments shall
reduce the amount payable hereunder for such injury." See Gunte v. Ford,
242 La. 943, 140 So. 2d 11 (1962).
56 198 A.2d 181 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964) ; aff'd, 205 A.2d 1 (1964). For a more
detailed discussion of Yarrington, see: Burt, A Recent Trend In Application
of the Collateral Source Doctrine: Elimination of Plaintiff Passenger's Double
Recovery for Medical Expenses, 16 FED. INs. COUNSEL QUAR. 78 (1965).
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The same result was reached in Ekblade v. Anderson 7 where the
court stated: "The ordinary purpose of automobile liability coverage is
for the carrier to make good or pay, but once, in behalf of the insured, a
claimant's damages as determined to be the proximate result of the
negligence of the insured. No needed fair end or good is to be served
by making payment twice for any part of medical expenses. '"
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reached the same result with-
out relying upon an exception to the collateral source rule or to any
particular provision in the insurance policy, but rather centered its
attack entirely upon the abhorrence of a double recovery on the part of
a passenger. The court stated:
In our opinion it was not within the contemplation of the con-
tracting parties that there should be a double recovery of medical
expenses .... It is manifestly inequitable for plaintiff to recover
twice against the same defendant, even though payment was in
part voluntary.5
9
The Court went further and presented a hypothetical which brought
the point home very strongly.
Consider the hypothetical, but quite probable, case where re-
covery is in excess of insurance limits, or a case where medical
payments are provided by insurance and financial responsibility
provided from defendant's personal assets; a court in such in-
stances could not in good conscience sustain a double recovery
for medical expenses.60
While the above cases reject the argument that two types of in-
surance were purchased for the benefit of a third party and therefore
benefits should be paid under both sections, a lower court in New York
decided otherwise. In Moore v. Leggette,6' the injured guest, after
being reimbursed for his medical expenses under the medical provisions
of the host's liability policy, sued the host for an amount including his
medical expenses. The host contended that the medical payments should
be considered in mitigation of damages. The court disagreed saying:
Two distinct forms of protection have been supplied for two
fees, and yet one payment here will relieve both obligations.
This possibility of double charge-single payment insurance is
even more unwarranted than this plaintiff might receive as a pos-
sible no-charge double recovery bonanza.6 2
However, this decision did not stand upon appeal to the appellate
division. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate divi-
5 28 Conn. Supp. 117, 255 A.2d 865 (1969).
58 Id., 255 A.2d at 866. See also language to same effect in earlier Connecticut
cases: Bruno v. Pinto, 2 Conn. 431, 434; L'Manian v. American Motorists
Ins. Co., 4 Conn. Cir. 524, 236 A.2d 349 (1967).
59 Tart v. Register, 257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754, 764 (1962).
6od., 125 S.E.2d at 764.
6145 Misc. 2d 603, 257 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1965).
62257 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
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sion's reversal in a subsequent appeal thus preventing the plaintiff from
obtaining a double recovery."
One of the more unusual decisions in the area of medical payments
insurance, first party insurance and set-offs is the case of Sims v.
National Casualty Company.6 4 The Florida Court of Appeals held that
while the medical expenses of the injured passenger were included in
the arbitrated amount the insured was to receive under the uninsured
motorist endorsement, the insured could also recover the same expenses
under the medical payments provision. The court held that the two
charges were separate and independent notwithstanding the finding that
the carrier had a valid right of subrogation against the uninsured tort-
feasor. The distinguishing element of the Sims case is that the injured
insured was claiming under the uninsured motorist protection and the
medical payments protection. The court stated that -since the premiums
for both coverages were paid by the insured, this situation should be
distinguishable from suits for double recovery against the tortfeasor's
insurer.
III. AGAINST WHOM CAN THE INSURER RECOVER PAYMENTS MADE
TO ITS INSURED.
A. The tortfeasor or the insured.
The subrogation provision in an endorsement or contract providing
medical expense benefits generally provides that the insurer obtains the
rights of the insured against any party who might be liable to the in-
sured in a civil action. Therefore, wherever the subrogation provision
can be enforced, the insurer should be able to recover its payments from
anyone liable to the insured. However, its rights may be limited.
Most jurisdictions have statutes providing that all necessary parties
must be joined in an action; failure to comply with such a requirement
would be grounds for the dismissal of the action. 5 As a result, an in-
surer may join its insured or the insurer may assign its rights to the
insured for purposes of suit or vice-versa, rather than having several
plaintiffs. Another alternative is to let the insured bring an action
against those liable to him and the insurer merely gives notice to the
defendants of its subrogation claim.
The most common procedure practiced today by insurers and hos-
pitalization-medical plans is to let the insured or subscriber bring an
action. The defendants are informed of the insurer's subrogation rights
either prior or subsequent to suit. As a practical matter stipulations with
63Reversed, 24 App. Div. 2d 891, 264 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1965); Reversal aff'd, 18
N.Y. 2d 864, 22 N.E.2d 737 (1966).
64 171 So. 2d 399 (Fla. App. 1965).
65 E.g. WVIs. STAT. § 260.13 (1969).
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respect to amount (but not liability) are often reached between the sub-
rogated insurer and allegedly responsible third party. Unlike a subroga-
tion claim for property damage, where the insured will not brin- su't
against the tortfeasor or other responsible party because his interest is
limited to a deductible, the injured party who has substantial medical
expenses will usually have a substantial enough personal injury claim
to bring suit against all possible defendants.
The insurer's pi oblems arise where the insured, after receiving pay-
ments from the insurer, settles with the tortfeasor or his liability
carrier. If the ,insurer has given notice to all interested parties, he may
have a cause of action against any one or all of the parties to the
original settlement.
The standard subrogation clause contains the provision that the
insured, after receiving payment from the company, shall not take any
action to prejudice the rights of the company. In the event that the
insured settles with the tortfeasor or any party liable for the acts of the
tortfeasor for an amount which includes the medical expenses incurred
by the insured and paid by the company, the company should have
the right to sue its insured for breach of the policy. In several cases,
this procedure has been affirmed by the courts.
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ritz"G the defendant was inju ed
as a result of the negligence of a third party. The plaintiff had paid the
defendant $1,865.39 for medical expenses pursuant to a policy contain-
ing a typical subrogation clause. In addition to this clause the pol'cy
contained a provision providing that in the event the insured had
already been reimbursed for his medical expenses by the tortfeasor or
one liable for the acts of the tortfeasor, then benefits under the medical
payments provision were excluded.
After the defendant-insured received the payment from the p',aintiiY
he arranged a settlement with the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's liability
carrier, and executed a release of all claims arising out of the accident
caused by the negligence of the third party. The settlement was con-
cluded notwithstanding the outstanding claim of the plaintiff, who had
given notice to the tortfeasor and his insurer, and had obtained a reim-
bursement agreement from the defendant when it paid the defendant
for his medical expenses.
The plaintiff brought suit against its insured and moved for sum-
mary judgment, alleging that the defendant had interfered with the
rights of the plaintiff under the policy and had breached the "reimburse-
ment" agrement. Plaintiff's motion was granted by the trial court on
the basis that the subrogation rights of the plaintiff under the policy
66 70 Wash. 2d 317, 422 P.2d 780 (1967).
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were violated because the release executed by the defendant for the
benefit of the tortfeasor released all claims. 7
On appeal, the supreme court agreed with the plaintiff and the
trial court, notwithstanding the admitted fact that the insurer had
refrained from taking any action against the tortfeasor or his insurer
because it had procured the "reimbursement agreement". The defen-
dant, on appeal, had argued that since the plaintiff had not taken any
steps against the tortfeasor he could not complain that those rights
were prejudiced because of the defendant's settlement. As a result of
the insurer's failure to take affirmative action the court held that it
was only equitable that the insurer contribute a pro-rata share of the
defendent's expenses incurred in arriving at the settlement with the
tortfeasor.
The insurer, then, may proceed against the insured where the in-
sured has prejudiced the subrogation rights of the insurer by settling his
claims against the tortfeasor and executing a release for all claims. The
basis of such a suit is breach of the contract.68 But what is the basis for
suit by the insurer against the tortfeasor or the liability carrier who,
with notice of the subrogation rights, nevertheless proceeds to settle
with the injured party and obtains a release of all claims which have
or will accrue to the injured party as a result of the acts of the tort-
feasor? This issue has been the subject of several cases," some of which
will be examined below.
In Davenport v. State Farm M11utual Automobile Ins. Co.,7 0 the
tortfeasor and his liability carrier ignored the plaintiff's subrogation
rights for the medical expenses incurred by the injured party. The in-
surer then brought suit against the tortfeasor and his carrier to recover
the amount of its subrogation interest. The Nevada Supreme Court, in
upholding the right of the subrogee to maintain his action against these
defendants, notwithstanding the complete release executed by the in-
jured party, stated:
67 The trial court did not base its motion on the "reimbursement" agreement be-
cause such was only a reaffirmation of the policy provisions and obligations.68 There is one case which has permitted the insurer to recover against the in-
sured where there was a settlement but no reimbursement to the insurer, not-
withstanding the possibility that subrogation for medical payments may have
been barred because of the common law rule prohibiting an assignment of a
cause of action for personal injuries. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Grimes, 278 Minn. 45, 153 N.W.2d 152 (1967).
69 Hospital Service Corp. of R.I. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105 (R.I.
1967) ; Associated Hosp. Service, Inc. v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis.
2d 170, 147 N.W.2d 225 (1967); Davenport v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 404 P.2d 10 (Nev. 1965). See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mid-
Century Ins. Co., 259 N.E.2d 424 (Ind App. 1970) where the issue was pre-
sented on appeal. However, the court refused to consider it because there
was no evidence in the record as to whether the liability carrier settled with
the injured subrogor after having received notice of the subrogation claim
from the plaintiff.
7081 Nev. 361, 404 P.2d 10 (1965).
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We hold that, where the [medical payments] clause of an auto-
mobile liability insurance policy subrogates the company to the
extent of the medical payments made by it to the assured "to
the proceeds of any settlement that may result from the exer-
cise of any rights of recovery which the injured person receiv-
ing such payments may have against any person," the tortfeasor
(or his insurer) may not disregard that known subrogation (or
lien) right in settling his liability.71
The opinon was not without dissent. Judge Collins argued that the
plaintiff's cause of action was against its own insured who breached the
policy provisions. The decision rendered in this case would penalize a
party who was not a party to the contract which was breached, and the
party who was guilty of the breach was rewarded in the form of a
double recovery for the injuries he sustained.
The same result reached in Davenport was reached in Hospital Ser-
vice Corp. of Rhode Island V. Pennsylvania Ins. Co.:
(Even though a cause of action for personal injuries cannot be
split, a better rule would be that) a release procurred by a tort-
feasor, who is aware that the insurer claims to be subrogated to
the rights of its insured, will not constitute a defense to the in-
surer's action against the wrongdoer to enforce its rights of sub-
rogation .... By settling the insured's claim with knowledge of
the insurer's interest, the tortfeasor was held to have consented
to a separation of the cause of action.72
However, the court added a caveat to this rule. The right of sub-
rogation may be lost by delay or conduct on the part of the subrogee
which can be construed as a waiver or estoppel. The subrogee may be
barred if the subrogor settles with the tortfeasor before payment by the
subrogee. The subrogee may be barred from proceeding against the
tortfeasor or his insurer when in good faith and without notice of the
subrogee's payment, he effectuates a settlement with the subrogor. And
finally, the subrogee cannot recover from its insured and the tortfeasor
or his carrier; he may recover from one or the other. These limitations
are equitable and impose on the insurer the minimal duty of watching
out for its own interest rather than placing that burden upon the in-
sured, the tortfeasor, or the liability carrier.
B. Other Insurance.
The insurer may also attempt to recover payments made for medical
expenses from another insurance carrier who provided liability protec-
tion, medical payments protection or Uninsured Motorist protection to
the injured party or the tortfeasor.
711d., 404 P.2d at 13. See also Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Godfrey, 12 Ohio
Misc. 143, 41 Ohio Ops. 2d 166, 230 N.E.2d 560 (1967) where the subrogated
insurance company was entitled to sue the tortfeasor in its own name to re-
cover for medical payments made to its insured. In this case the fact that the
defendant had settled with the injured insured was held not controlling.72227 A.2d 105, 112 (R.I. 1967).
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As previously indicated, the insurer should be permitted to recover its
payments from any liability carrier of the tortfeasor, in a jurisdiction
where subrogation provisions are valid. Whether it may directly sue the
carrier is dependent upon compliance with the necessary party require-
ments and direct action statutes in force in the controlling jurisdiction.
The carrier may also attempt to recover from other carriers or plans
providing medical expenses on behalf of the insured basing its rights
upon one of two provisions in its policy or contract the "other insur-
ance" provision or the subrogation provision. The scope of this article
prohibits a discussion of rights under an "other insurance" provision
or the validity of such a provision in a medical expense protection
endorsement7 3
Whether or not a subrogated insurer or health plan would be
entitled to recover from another carrier or plan providing similar bene-
fits on behalf of the insured, solely on the basis of the subrogation pro-
visions, has not been decided by any case uncovered in the research for
this article. It would appear to this writer that such an attempt would
be novel and unsuccessful. In order for the court to recognize such a
right, it would have to hold that one party providing first party insur-
ance benefits would be able to recover from another party who stands in
the same shoes, without any reasonable distinction present to justify
the apparent arbitrary result.
An interesting and as yet unanswered question is whether or not an
insurer may seek reimbursement from the injured party's uninsured
motorist carrier.7 4  The purpose of the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment is to compensate the insured for his personal injuries as if the un-
insured motorist was in fact insured in accordance with the state finan-
cial responsibility law.75 If the tortfeasor was insured, -the insurer would
7 For a discussion of such a provision see Pouros, Melendes and Craig, Medical
Payments Provision of the Auto-mobile Insurance Policy: An Illustration of
First Party Insurance Problems, 52 MAR9. L. REv. 445 (1969).
74Uninsured Motorist Protection coverage is a combination of first party and
third party insurance protection. Generally speaking, this is an insurance
which compensates its own insured for any and all personal injuries suffered
as a result of the acts of an "uninsured motorist," i.e., generally, a defendant
without liability protection. Many of the states have passed legislation re-
quiring such insurance in all policies or requiring that it be offered to all
policyholders. So. CAROLINA CODE OF LAWS § 46-750.14 (1962) [required to be
in policy]; Wis. STAT. § 204.30(5) (1969) [only required to be offered]. For
detailed examinations of "uninsured motorist" insurance see: R. Cox, Un-
insured Motorist Coverage, 34 Mo. L. Rzv. 1 (1969) ; Symposium, The Un-
insured Motorist Endorsement, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 319 (1970).
75 Because "uninsured motorist" protection provides benefits for many potential
insureds under the definition of an "insured", several policies could also apply
providing certain elements of personal injury, such as medical expenses. For
example, a passenger in a car owned by B, being operated by A, is injured
when such vehicle is struck in the rear by another vehicle operated and/or
owned by one without liability protection. In such a case the injured party may
be entitled to benefits for medical expenses under his own hospitalization-
medical care plan such as Blue Cross-Blue Shield, in addition to being en-
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be reimbursed for payments made to its insured for medical expenses.
Should not the insurer be permitted to proceed against the uninsured
motorist carrier? The author has found no reported case which has
either decided or even considered the issue.
The uninsured motorist carrier's strongest argument is that its
endorsement provides benefits to its insured-it is first party insurance
-it does not provide any benefits on behalf of the tortfeasor. The
rights which are transferred from the injured party to the medical
expense insurer are only those which the insured could recover from
the tortfeasor or one responsible for the acts of the tortfeasor. Subroga-
tion under a medical expense or health care contract is not, and cannot
operate as, an assignment of all rights and benefits accruing to its
insured.
Therefore, the medical expense insurer is not entitled to any other
benefits the insured may accrue because of his injuries. The carrier
should not be entitled to benefit from a contract between principals
entirely foreign to the subrogated carrier or health plan.
On the other hand, the subrogated party or carrier could contend
that it is subrogated, not merely to the insured's rights against the tort-
feasor, but to any rights the insured accrued as the result of injury
caused by the acts of a third party. The rights acquired by the insured
to compensation from an "uninsured motorist" carrier accrued as a
result of the negligence of a third party. Therefore, the medical pay-
ments carrier or health plan has, to the extent of its payments, been
substituted for its insured as 'beneficiary under an uninsured motorist
endorsement.
In addition, the subrogated insurer can turn one of the arguments
of the "uninsured motorist" carrier around. The insured has, by contract,
shifted its rights under any policy providing protection from the negli-
gence of another (on either third party beneficiary status or otherwise)
to his medical expense insurer. The "uninsured motorist" carrier, who
collected a premium for the benefits due the injured party, cannot escape
liability under its contract as a result of a contract to which it was not
a party.
Even -though no case law exists, a court faced with this issue might
base its decision on the principle that health insurers and pre-paid
medical service plans are "primary insurers" and should not be per-
mitted to recover from the "uninsured motorist" carrier who is a
"secondary" insurer.
It is important to recall that in the majority of the states "unin-
sured motorist" protection must be offered as additional coverage in
titled to benefits under the automobile policies issued to A, or to B, both of
which may contain an uninsured motorist endorsement.
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automobile insurance policies issued in that state. In some states it is
absolutely required, while in others it must be offered, but can be
rejected by the insured in writing. It would seem then that it was not
the intention of the various legislatures to protect third parties, but
rather to protect those who attempt to insure themselves against loss
caused by those who insist on being irresponsible. The public policy
expressed in such legisation is that of protecting families from the
financial disasters which automobile accidents can suddenly cause. It is
accomplished by spreading the cost of injury among those in the com-
munity who own or operate motor vehicles by way of insurance pro-
grams. But since "uninsured motorist" coverage is very much in a
sense "secondary" insurance, collectable only if the tortfeasor is not
insured or if coverage is denied, it is likely that a court would be un-
willing to permit a "primary" insurer to enforce its subrogation rights
against the "uninsured motorist" insurance company.
That unwillingness to sanction recovery by primary insurers against
"uninsured motorist" insurance coverage has been demonstrated in a
number of cases in which the primary insurers involved were work-
men's compensation carriers.
Of particular interest here is the following clause often found in
uninsured motorist coverage provisions:
This insurance does not apply so as to insure directly or in-
directly to the benefits of any Workmen's Compensation or dis-
ability benefits carrier or any person or organization qualifying
as a self-insurer under any Workmen's Compensation or dis-
ability benefits law or similar law.7 1
Horne v. Superior Life Ins. Co. 77 provides an illustration of the
problem involved when a "primary" carrier attempts to enforce its sub-
rogation rights against the Uninsured Motorist carrier. In Home an
employee's claim against his employer's compensation carrier was dis-
missed by the trial court because the employee, by settling with his
"uninsured motorist" carrier, had destroyed the compensation carrier's
subrogation rights against the "uninsured motorist" carrier. The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the purpose of the
uninsured motorist law was to provide additional protection to the in-
sured, not to third parties. It said:
[The "uninsured motorist" insurer] does not stand in the shoes
of . . . the uninsured motorist. . . . [Its] liability to the insured
is contractual. . . . Mrs. Horne chose to provide . . . additional
protection under the uninsured motorist for herself and others
protected thereby and not the Superior . . . Superior's rights of
subrogation are against.., the alleged third party tortfeasor .... Is
76 See: Monograph: Uninsured Motorist Coverage, DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTI-
TUTE (1968).
7 203 Va. 282, 123 S.E.2d 401 (1962).
781d., 123 S.E.2d at 405.
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Since the compensation carrier's subrogation rights did not include
the benefits of the uninsured motorist protection afforded the employee,
the employee did not destroy any rights of the compensation carrier. It
is true, admitted the court, that the Workmen's Compensation Act pro-
vides that the employee shall not make a double recovery against the
employer and the tortfeasor. :However, Horne's first recovery was
against the "uninsured motorist" insurer, not the tortfeasor, therefore,
the employee was entitled to workmen's compensation benefits.
In Commissioner of State Ins. Fund v. Miller79 a New York court
denied the workmen's compensation carrier's subrogation rights against
the "uninsured motorist" carrier on the theory that the insured had not
recovered from the tortfeasor but had received payments from his "un-
insured motorist" carrier, whose liability, athough based in part on the
contingency of a third party's tort liability, was merely contractual. The
court acknowledged that the compensation carrier's right to a lien,
created by statute, would remain unimpaired if the insured achieved a
recovery from the tortfeasor and that it could sue the latter if the
employee failed to act, but held that the compensation carrier was not
entitled to the benefit of any insurance by which the employee might
provide additional protection at his own expense.5 0
An analogous situation occurs when a collision insurer which has
paid the damages caused by the actionable negligence of an uninsured
motorist commences subrogation proceedings against the uninsured
motorist coverage carrier.
In Motorist Ins. Corp. v. Surety Ins. Corp.,s1 it was held that the
collision carrier was not entitled to be "indemnified" by the "uninsured
motorist" insurance company. The court recognized that:
An action by an insurer who has paid a covered loss against a
person whose tortious conduct caused the injury presents a clear
case for subrogation. [However], an insurer, on payment of a
covered loss, has no right of recovery against a third person
merely upon proof that the insured could have recovered from
such a person .
2
The court was impressed with the fact that the collision insurer col-
lected a premium for its coverage while the uninsured motorist insurer
was prohibited from collecting a premium for such coverage by state
law. The court, therefore, concluded:
794 App. Div. 2d 481, 166 N.Y.S.2d 777 (1967).
so See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 1256 (1951). Were the compensation carrier's rights
against the tortfeasor unimpaired? The standard uninsured motorist endorse-
ment provides that in the event of payment under the endorsement, the in-
surer shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the tortfeasor.
Are those subrogation rights in turn subject to the rights of the compensation
carrier or are they equal to the rights of the compensation carrier?
81134 S.E.2d 631 (S.C. 1964).
82 Id., at 632.
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The purpose of the [Uninsured Motorist] Act was to relieve [an]
insured motorist, within specified limits, of the risk of injury
from the tortious conduct of financially irresponsible, uninsured
motorist.... Nothing in the terms of the Act indicate the inten-
tion to relieve other insurers of primary responsibility for their
own contractual obligations or to benefit them in any way.8 3
The same question arose in Bobbitt v. Shelby Mutuwl Ins. Co.84
where judgment had been rendered against the uninsured in one action,
and the insured, on behalf of his collision carrier, brought suit against
the "uninsured motorist" carrier. The latter denied liability because of
a provision in its policy that the property damage coverage therein
applied as "only excess insurance over any other valid collectable in-
surance of any kind." The court quoted from Horne:
"Here, [the uninsured motorist carrier] does not stand in the
-shoes of the . .. insured motorist. Its policy does not insure
[the uninsured motorist] against liability. It insures [the in-
sured] . . . against inadequate compensation."8 5
The court, following Motors Insurance Corp. v. Surety,86 held that
the "uninsured motorist" carrier did not stand in the shoes of the tort-
feasor, against whom the collision carrier did have a right of subroga-
tion. It also held that while the Virginia Uninsured Motorists Act87
required the uninsured motorist to pay to the insured.all sums which he
would be entitled to receive from the uninsured motorist, "[A] n insurer
of the named insured was not defined as an 'insured' ..."88
There is another area involving the rights of a subrogee to recover
from an 'insured motorist" carrier after it has paid the medical ex-
penses of a party entitled to benefits under the "uninsured motorist"
endorsement. This remaining area deals with the rights of the govern-
ment under Federal medicare programs.
In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. United States89 a
serviceman's dependent was injured by an uninsured motorist. The in-
surer of the car in which the dependent was riding when injured made
a settlement with him for personal injuries but refused to reimburse
the federal government for the medical expenses it incurred on his
behalf. The serviceman's uninsured motorist policy obligated the in-
surer "to pay all sums which the insured ... shall be legally entitled
to recover as damages from the owner oroperator of an uninsured auto-
mobile." Further, the term "insured" under this provision was defined
to include:
83 Id.
84209 Va. 37, 161 S.E.2d 671 (1968).
85 161 S.E.2d at 673.
86 134 S.E.2d 631.
87 VA. CODE ANNOT. § 38.1-381 (1970).
88 161 S.E.2d at 674. emphasis added.
89 376 F.2d 836 (4 Cir. 1967).
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(b) any other person while occupying an uninsured automobile;
and
(c) any person with respect to damages he is entitled to recover
because of bodily injury to which this part applies sustained
by an insured under (a) or (b) above.
Because the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act9 0 provides that the
federal government has an independent right to recover from a tort-
feasor for medical expenses it pays, the Court held that the Federal
Government met the requirement of (c) above. The court, as a result,
concluded that the United States: "relies on that [Federal Medical
Recovery] Act merely to establish its right to recover of the uninsured
motorist... But it plants its right to recover upon the express language
of the policy, which provides that one entitled to recover of the unin-
sured third party is in turn entitled to payment under the policy as an
insured as defined in Sec. (c) ...-91
By passage of the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, the Federal
Government was thus able to recover the expenses it incurred from an
uninsured motorist carrier. This might serve as an example of legis-
lation which medical carriers could urge state legislatures to enact for
protection of their subrogated claims. Of course, such legislation is
doubtful, as the federal government was serving its own self-interest
in passing the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, while state legis-
latures have no reason to favor private medical payments carriers over
private uninsured motorist carriers, and it might appear particularly
unjust to do so where state law requires that uninsured motorist cover-
age must be offered.
IV. DIvisIoN OF PRocEEDs BETWEEN SUBROGATED INSURER AND
CLAIMANT
There are several practical problems concerning division of pro-
ceeds between the subrogated insurer and the individual claimant when
a liable tortfeasor has limited financial responsibility or a liability insur-
ance contract with applicable limits less than the total size of the claim
or claims. Frequently both factors enter into the picture.
Pro-rating between a subrogated insurer and a claimant in com-
parative negligence states ought to be quite simple. Assuming a $10,000
injury, a claimant 30% causally negligent, and an insurer subrogated
to the extent of $1,000, it would appear logical and fair that the sub-
rogated insurer should receive from the proceeds of the judgment
(or negotiated settlement) 70% of his claim ($1,000 minus $300-
representing the proportionate share of comparative negligence) which
equals $700. In the opinion of the writer this is the clearly applicable
law and the generally accepted practice in comparative negligence states.
9042 U.S.C. § 265(a).
91376 F.2d at 847.
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The subrogated insurer scales its recovery downward in the same pro-
portion that its insured must scale down his recovery.
Unfortunately, in Wisconsin in a 1932 decision, Patitucci v. Ger-
hardt12 it was contended that the acceptance of part payment from the
collision insurer operated as an assignment "pro tanto" of the plaintiff's
cause of action. Many health and accident insurers have -argued the
phrase "pro tanto" means that on any recovery the subrogated insurer
receives the entire proceeds up to the amount of its subrogation claim.
While it is difficult to perceive how a more inequitable treatment could
be afforded to the individual insured, this writer knows of many cases
where settlement has been negotiated based on this principle. The
majority of settlements, however, proceed on the basis of a pro rata
distribution of funds between the subrogated insurer and its insured.
While this writer knows of no specific cases on the subject it is his
opinion that if litigated this would be the result in all the jurisdictions
studied.
In states in which contributory negligence bars recovery, theoretically,
the problem of distribution between the subrogated insurer and its
insured does not exist. Obviously if there is liability for the medical
expenses, there also would be liability for the personal injuries. Any
recovery, therefore, would pay to the subrogated insurer the entire
amount of its medical expenses.
As a practical matter, however, a principle very similar to the
applicable rule in comparative negligence states applies. Assuming $1,000
of medical expenses in a personal injury case reasonably worth $10,000
with the likelihood of recovery in the area of 70% for the plaintiffs, a
negotiated settlement at $7,000 would result in additional negotiations
between the subrogated insurer and its insured with equitable distribu-
tion of the proceeds in an amount of $6,300 to the individual claimant
and $700 to his subrogated insurer.
Experienced trial counsel will immediately realize, however, that
upon trial this equitable result probably will not be the case.
As a practical matter there are very few damage defenses better
than a close liability question. In states in which contributory negli-
gence bars recovery, therefore, the trial of a 70-30 potential liability
case might well result in recovery for the plaintiff, but with a some-
what diminished damage award. If the case were tried successfully for
the claimant, it would mean that the subrogated insurer would receive
100% of its expended funds, and this realistic analysis is frequently
exploited on behalf of subrogated insurers when negotiating settlements
with its insureds in these states.
92 206 Wis. 358, 240 N.W. 385 (1932).
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Where the liable tortfeasor has limited financial resources through
insurance or otherwise, it would appear that the most equitable manner
of distribution of proceeds by settlement or after judgment between the
subrogated insurer and the individual insured would be on a pro rata
basis.
In the administration of subrogation claims for H & A carriers this
is a frequently occurring problem. Claimant (often a non negligent,
guest passenger) incurs severe personal injuries with a reasonable jury
verdict value of $100,000. It develops, however, that the individual
defendant is not financially responsible and the applicable limits of
liability on his auto insurance policy is $10,000 for any one person in-
jured in any one accident. The subrogated insurer has paid $10,000 for
hospital and medical expenses. The equitable rule (although there are
few cases on it) would distribute the $10,000 of available proceeds
$9,000 to the insured and $1,000 to the subrogated insurer.
A 1967 New Jersey case93 considered this issue. Germer was riding
in Root's car and was injured when struck -by a car negligently driven
by Stallone. Germer received $2,000 in medical payments from Root's
insurer. Germer brought action against Stallone and Root. The jury
absolved Root of negligence and assessed the entire negligence against
Stallone. A judgment was entered for Germer's injuries for $60,500.
Stallone's insurance had a $10,000 policy limit. Root's insurer main-
tained that it should receive back, out of the $10,000 of proceeds under
its subrogation clause the entire $2,000 that it had expended. The court
ruled against the insurer saying: "Since she only received approxi-
mately one-sixth of her judgment in this proceeding, equitable prin-
ciples compel the court to conclude that Seaboard (the insurer) recover
one-sixth of the $2,000, or $333 . . ."94 The court noted that it was
unable to find any cases supporting this position. The writer believes,
however, -that it should be the universally accepted rule. 3
An analogous situation involving fire insurance occurred in Pontiac
Mutual County Fire and Lightening Insurance Co. v. Sheibley 6
Sheibley's farm, insured by Pontiac Mutual for $800, was completely
destoyed by fire caused by a railroad company's negligence. Sheibley
obtained a $4,000 verdict against the railroad. It appealed and a settle-
ment ultimately was negotiated at $3,000. Pontiac demanded from
Sheibley a pro rata share of the proceeds, that is, three-quarters of
what it had paid Sheibley on the theory that he recovered three-quarters
of the damages as assessed by the jury. Sheibley, however, refused to
93 Germer v. Public Service M'%ut. Ins. Co., 99 N.J. Super. 137, 238 A.2d 713
94 Id., 238 A.2d at 717.
(1967).
95 See also, Blue Cross of Florida v. O'Donnell, 230 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1970 [im-
plying same result as in Germner].
96279 111. 118, 116 N.E. 644 (1917).
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pay, saying that since all his losses as determined by the jury had not
been recovered, the insurance company was not entitled to reimburse-
ment. The court ruled in favor of Pontiac. The Illinois Supreme Court,
noting that Pontiac had offered to help in the appeal, affirmed saying
that Pontiac was entitled to its pro rata share of the proceeds of the
negotiated settlement.
On occasion a further complication arises when the subrogated
insurer has not paid the entire amount of the hospital and medical
charges either because of limitations in its policy or because it feels
treatment was not reasonable and necessary for the injuries incurred.
There are no reported decisions directly ruling in this area, but practical
administration would favor an equitable distribution on a pro rata basis
taking the entire amount of the insured's claim (for personal injuries,
wage loss, or uncompensated medical expense) as compared with the
amount of the claim of the subrogated insurer. This problem is more
easily manageable in jurisdictions that permit separate answers to the
damage questions in a special verdict where the question of reasonable-
ness and necessity of expenditures for medical expenses is raised.
V. RIGHT OF ATTORNEY TO COLLECT FEES FROM SUBROGATED INSURER
In many instances where the injured party brings suit against the
torifeasor, the subrogated insurer or prepaid medical expense organiza-
tion will not take its own legal action-rather it will merely give notice
of its subrogation interests. These claims may or may not be recognized,
however, in most cases they are, and insurers recover their payments
from the settlement fund or judgment rendered. The question then
arises as to whether or not the insurer may recover the full amount, or
whether an amount must be deducted for expenses incurred in obtaining
the recovery including attorney's fees.
The following hypothetical will illustrate some of the problems
facing the attorney representing the injured party, the insured party,
and the insurer.
John Jones is injured in an automobile accident caused by the negli-
gence of Bill Smith. As a result of the accident, John has incurred
medical expenses amounting to $1,500.00, which are paid by the XYZ
insurance company under a "medical payments" endorsement which
includes a subrogation provision. John then hires an attorney, George
Thomas, agreeing to pay Mr. Thomas a 1/3 contingent fee in the event
of trial.
After a jury awards $6,000.00 to Jones, XYZ Insurance Company,
which expended $1,500 for Jones' medical expenses pursuant to the
medical payments coverage in his automobile insurance policy, claims
it is entitled to a return of $1,500 because of its subrogation provision
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in the policy. Thomas, who has handled the case for Jones on a 1/3 con-
tingent fee basis, contemplates a number of possible ways of dividing
the award.
(1) Jones returns $1,500 to XYZ, gives 1/3 of the remaining
$4,500 to Attorney Thomas ($1,500), and keeps $3,000 for
himself;
(2) Attorney Thomas gets 1/3 of the entire recovery ($2,000),
XYZ receives its $1,500 in full, and Jones is left with only
$2,500;
(3) Attorney Thomas gets 1/3 of the entire recovery ($2,000), and
Jones returns the $1,500 to XYZ but deducts a reasonable
amount for attorney's fees;
(4) Attorney Thomas takes $500, or 1/3 for the amount to be re-
turned to the insurer, and an additional $1,500 from the $4,500
which is to go to Jones.
The problem must first be considered in light of the generally held
view that the mere fact that the services an attorney renders for his
client are beneficial to other parties does not entitle the attorney to re-
cover any compensation from those also benefited 7 It is also generally
held that the client who has engaged an attorney and paid his fees is not
usually entitled to recover a proportionate share of the attorney's fees
from those who may receive a benefit from the service?8
In addition, it should be remembered that the initial agreement for
attorney's fees is worked out only by the injured party and the attor-
ney. Thus, most claims by the subrogee, under the above law and
facts, would not be subject to attorney's fees. Either the attorney or the
injured client will have to take the loss. However, the majority rule in
regard to fees due an attorney as a result of obtaining recovery for his
client's subrogated insurer imposes some obligation on the insurer.
Because "medical payments" protection with subrogation is a rela-
tively new item in insurance packages, and only recently included in
health care contracts, only a few jurisdictions have had the opportunity
to consider a dispute over attorney's fees? 9 Medical expenses are not,
in reality, unliquidated damages such as pain and suffering, but rather
they are specific and definite, thus separable from the general damages
awarded for personal injury.
Because medical expenses are liquidated, the courts have relied
upon and have treated the claim for legal fees the same as in other
97 7 Ax. Ju. 2d, Attorneys at Law § 205. See also, Eckford v. Atlanta, 173 Ga.
650, 160 S.E. 773 (1931) ; 7 CJ.S., Attorney and Client § 175.
987 At. Jup. 2d, Attorneys at Law § 205; see also: Louisiana and N.W.R. v.
Athens Lumber Co., 134 La. 788, 64 So. 714, (1914); Christian Women's
Benev. Assoc. v. Atlanta Trust Co., 181 Ga. 576, 183 S.E.551 (1936).
99 For a general discussion of this issue, see Annot., 2 A.L.R.4d 1441.
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cases concerning subrogation of other various damages, such as col-
lision, fire and workmen's compensation. 100
Where an insurer, underwriting a fire risk, perfects his subrogation
rights 'by a recovery resulting solely from the efforts of the insured's
legal counsel the more widely adopted rule is that the insurer must
contribute a "proportionate" or "reasonable" share of the attorney's
fees.' However, such obligation is not absolute. In Cary v. Phoenix,'0 "
the insurers underwriting the fire loss risk were not required to con-
tribute to the attorney's fees because it appeared that the insured had
assigned her entire interest in the recovery to her attorney in order to
defraud the carriers. Had the action against the tortfeasor been prose-
cuted in good faith, for the benefit, wholly or in part, of the insurance
companies, the court indicated that the insurers might have been re-
quired to contribute toward the expenses of the action.
Nor is an insurer underwriting the fire loss risk required to con-
tribute toward 'the attorney's fees where the insurer has actively par-
ticipated in the preparation and trial of the case.10 3
Automobile insurers generally have been permitted to recover for
property damage as subrogees where they have paid the insured's
property loss under the "collision" endorsement. However, they have
also been required to share the expenses of attorneys fees where their
insureds initiated recovery. 04
United Services Auto Association v. I-fills,0 5 the leading case con-
cerning the duty of the insurer to contribute to attorney's fees, in-
volved a case where the insured's attorney was advised by the insurer,
United, to delete the insurer's subrogation claim from the insured's suit
against the tortfeasor. The attorney refused asserting if he deleted
such claim, then the insured's action could be dismissed because of the
prohibition of splitting a cause of action. A settlement between the tort-
feasor's insurer, which had been notified by United of its interest and
100 Generally, the compensation carrier has been required to pay a portion of the
employee's cost and expenses, including a portion of the attorney's fees. See
LARSEN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 4:32 (1965).
101 Brown v. T. W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co., 105 F. Supp. 479 (D.C. Pa. 1962)
["proportionate"]; Suea Assurance Co. v. Packham, 92 Md. 464, 48 A. 359,
52 L.R.A. 95 (1901).
102 Conn. 690, 78 A. 426 (1910).
303 Pontiac Mut. County Fire and Lightning Ins. Co. v. Sheibley, 279 Ill. 118,
116 N.E. 644 (1917).
104 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Elkins, 451 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. 1970);
Krause v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 184 Neb. 588, 169 N.W.2d 601(1969); aff'd on rehearing, 184 Neb. 639, 170 N.W.2d 882 (1969) ; Washington
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hammett, 237 Ark. 954, 377 S.W.2d 811 (1964) ;
Forsyth v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 162 So. 2d 916 (Fla. App. 1964) ; Tennes-
see Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pritchett, 54 Tenn. App. 410, 391 S.W.2d 671(1964); United Service Auto Assoc. v. Hills, 172 Neb. 128, 109 N.W.2d 208
(1961). But see, State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Robbins, 237 So. 2d 208(Fla. App. 1970) ; First of Georgia Ins. Co. v. Horne, 120 Ga. App. 379, 170
S.E. 2d 452 (1969).
105 172 Neb. 128, 109 N.W.2d 174 (1961).
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had agreed to protect United's rights, and the insured was reached as a
result of the work of the attorney. United then brought a declaratory
judgment action seeking to determine the validity of the attorney's claim
for 1/3 of the amount that was to go to United. The court held that
since the subrogation claim had to be brought in the insured's suit, con-
siderations of justice and equity required that United pay the fees.
In Krause v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. 10 6 the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that the sum recovered by the insured in a suit
against a tortfeasor (or agreed upon as settlement) was in the nature of
a trust to the extent of the collision carrier's subrogation interests.
Therefore, the court stated, that the right to a fee by the insured's
attorney follows as a matter of course, since the services rendered by
the attorney were beneficial to the administration of the trust and the
right of the beneficiary.
Although the attorney was entitled to a fee to be paid out of the pro-
ceeds distributed to the insurer, what that fee should be was not deter-
mined. The case was remanded with an order for a new trial on the
issue of what amount would fairly compensate the attorney for the
services rendered the trust. The court then laid down the following
guidelines for the trial court:
We do not hold in this case that State Farm is bound by the
contract for fees between the plaintiff's attorney and the insured
in the action against the tortfeasor. The allowance depends upon
consideration of all these circumstances including the nature of
the contract with the insured and the amount and the nature of
the services rendered, and the other principles relating to the
award of attorney's fees under the law.10 7
First of Georgia Ins. Co. v. Home0 8 is typical of the minority rule
which does not require the insurer to contribute to the attorney's fees.
In this case the court maintained that the relationship of the attorney
and client is a contractual one, and since there was no express contract
of employment between the attorney and the subrogated insurer, the
attorney was held to be a mere volunteer not entitled to a fee for the
amount of the insurer's subrogation interests.
At least one state, in determining whether or not the insurer must
contribute, has distinguished a subrogation agreement from a "loan
receipt" executed by the insured at time of payment for his property
loss. In State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Robbins,10 9 an attorney's
right to claim a fee from a collision carrier was denied, whereas in
Forsyth v. Southern Bell Tel. Co.' 0 the court permitted the attorney
106 184 Neb. 588, 169 N.W.2d 601 (1969) ; aff'd on rehearing, 184 Neb. 639, 170
N.W.2d 882 (1969).
107 Id., 9 N.W.2d at 604.
108 120 Ga. App. 379, 170 S.E.2d 452 (1969).
109 237 So. 2d 208 (Fla. App. 1970).
110 162 So. 2d 916 (Fla. App. 1964).
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to deduct his fees from the proceeds accruing to the benefit of the sub-
rogated insurer. In Forsyth the insurer had obtained a "loan receipt"
from the insured. In Robbins the court argued that the "loan receipt"
did not give rise to a separate cause of action, so that its interest was
and could only be served by suit brought by the insured's attorney.
However, in the case before it, State Farm had notified the insured's
attorney that it would proceed alone for its subrogation interests and
could do so because it had obtained a "subrogation receipt," which pur-
ported to give the insurer a separate cause of action. Having ignored
State Farm's notice that it would proceed separately, the attorney was
not entitled to deduct an amount for fees. The attorney could not even
recover in quantum meruit since, said the court, "State Farm received
no benefit from the Appellees from the work performed in the suit...""I
In most jurisdictions the right of the employer or workmen's com-
pensation carrier to be subrogated to the rights of the injured employee
is statutory. In some instances the statutes even set out the method in
which the proceeds are distributed, first permitting the attorney to deduct
his fee on the total amount recovered, then specified portions of the
remainder are distributed to the employer or carrier and the em-
ployee.1 1 2 In other jurisdictions, the statutes are not specific on distribu-
tion. In such jurisdictions, the court determines an equitable distribu-
tion.
An interesting decision is Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Scott." '1
Scott was retained by an employee of Commercial's insured to recover
f om the tortfeasor losses sustained by the employee. Scott arranged a
settlement with the tortfeasor and forwarded a check to Commercial for
the amount it had paid the injured employee along with a statement of
fees amounting to 1/3 of the subrogated amount. The court denied the
right of the attorney to claim any fee from the subrogation recovery:
The fact that the defendant was benefited by the plaintiff's ser-
vices in obtaining a settlement does not make it liable for the
plaintiff for such incidental benefits. Plaintiff's motive for suing
the third party tortfeasor, it must be assumed, was to obtain an
adequate recovery for his own client, and, thereby an attorney's
fee for himself, rather than to obtain reimbursement for the
defendant.1
1 4
1' State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Robbins, 237 So. 2d at 210.
-12 WIs. STAT. § 102.29(1) (1969) :
[The] liability of the tortfeasor shall be determined as to all parties
having a right to make a claim, and irrespective of whether or not all
parties join in prosecuting said claim, the proceeds . . .shall be divided
as follows: After deducting the reasonable cost of collection, one-
third of the remainder shall in any event be paid to the injured em-
ployee. . . .out of the balance remaining, the employer or insurance
carrier shall be reimbursed for all payments made by it or which it
may be obligated to make. . . .Any balance remaining shall be paid
to the employee .....
313 116 Ga. App. 633, 158 S.E.2d 295 (1967).
114 Id., 158 S.E.2d at 297.
[Vol. 54
SUBROGATION CLAUSES
Although the insurer was to receive full reimbursement from the
injured party, the attorney was entitled to collect his contingent fee
from the entire sum which had been obtained by settlement with the
tortfeasor rather than merely the amount to which his client was entitled.
In addition to the cases arising out of workmen's compensation the
issue of attorney fees has been raised in several recent medical expense
subrogation cases. These cases involve property loss by fire or collision.
In Bradford v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co."' the court
ruled against an insured who brought suit against his insurer to recover
the legal fees incurred in recovering his medical expenses from the
torifeasor. The insured had settled with the tortfeasor just eight days
after sending a claim for medical expenses to the insurer. Since the
insurer had not made any claim to the funds recovered from the tort-
feasor (although once it had paid the medical expenses it would have
had a right to subrogation under the policy), had not denied liability
for -the medical payments, nor engaged in delaying tactics, the insurer
was not liable for any portion of the costs of procuring the settlement
from the tortfeasor.
An attorney's claim to a fee from the insurer which had obtained a
"loan receipt" from its insured after paying medical expenses was
denied in Courtney v. Birdsong."6 The court in Courtney held that the
sum which the insurer had expended for medical payments was the
sum which the insured had agreed to reimburse the insurer, and that
since the insurer had not agreed to pay the attorney a fee it need not
do so.
Minnesota has indirectly permitted the insured to recover a portion
of his costs of procuring a settlement or recovery against the tortfeasor.
In National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Grimes 17 the insured refused to
reimburse the insurer after recovering from the tortfeasor although the
insurer had a valid claim under the subrogation provision in the policy.
The insurer was entitled to reimbursement, said the court, but went
on to say:
[The insured is] entitled to off-set against the $970.20 received
by him from the plaintiff, the reasonable worth and value of the
efforts expended and expenses incurred by the defendant proper-
ly chargeable to that portion of the recovery from [the tort-
feasor] attributable to those medical expenses . . . The amount
of such an off-set is for determination by the trial court."'$
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently rendered what may be the
new leading case in this area-State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Geline.119 In addition to adopting the majority position allowing at-
3"- 245 A.2d 428 (Pa. Super. 1968).
16 437 S.W.2d 238 (Ark. 1969).
117 278 Minn. 45, 153 N.W.2d 152 (1967).
I's 153 N.W.2d at 156.
1"9 48 Wis. 2d 290, 179 N.W.2d 815 (1970).
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torney's fees, the Geline case set out specific procedures that must be
followed by the insured's attorney before a claim can be made. It
seems both practical and consistent with an attorney's ethical rule not to
represent a client without specific authorization.
In this case both State Farm and Associated Hospital Services, Inc.
(AHS), pursuant to provisions in the respective policy and contract
containing subrogation clauses, paid part of the medical expenses of
their insureds who were injured in an automobile accident. The acci-
dent allegedly was caused by Bauke, who was insured by Allstate Ins.
Co. The Conovers consulted and retained Geline to represent them in an
action against Bauke and his carrier, Allstate. The retainer agreement
between Geline and Conovers set as fees, the standard contingency
agreement used in Wisconsin. In essence the contingency contract pro-
vided that the attorney's fee would be equal to 25% of the recovery on
behalf of the clients if the claim was settled prior to commencement of
suit, 33-1/3% after commencement of suit and 40% after appeal.
The Conovers, by their attorney, commenced the action, but settled
with Allstate and Bauke prior to trial. However, prior to the settlement
both AHS and State Farm gave notice to Allstate of their subrogation
rights and the amount of their claims. Allstate, however, igno:ed such
notices and entered into a settlement agreement-putting the amount in
escrow subject to a determination of rights between the Conovers and
Geline as against AHS and State Farm. Geline claimed that he was
entitled to 1/3 of each subrogation claim since he had procured the
settlement fund. The two subrogated parties then brought a declaratory
judgment action. The trial court found that Geline was entitled to a 1/3
fee of each subrogation claim.
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that Geline was
not entitled to the 1/3 fee from the insurers since there was no reason
to hold that Geline was retained by the Conovers to collect from or for
State Farm and/or AHS. However, the court accepted the "fund doc-
trine" (the majority rule) and held that: An attorney rendering service
in creating a trust may in equity be allowed compensation out of the
whole fund from those who directly benefit from its accumulation. 20
The court, in adopting the "fund" doctrine stated that such doctrine
had superior merit in equity than that proposed by the subrogated
parties. However, the court, in adopting the more equitable doctrine,
placed strict restrictions on its use, and thereby created a procedure
which can readily be followed by either the attorney or the subrogated
parties. These restrictions are as follows:
120 Id. at 298, 179 N.W.2d at 819.
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(1) Creation of fund.
The fund has to be brought into being solely by the efforts of
the attorney who is claiming an equitable right to the fees
therefrom.
(2) Notice.
Notice has to be given the holders of subrogated interests, not
only that an action has been commenced but also that, unless
the holder elects to join in the action as a party thereto, a
reasonable fee for services rendered in accomplishing the col-
lection of its subrogated interest will be requested of the court
in any settlement or court disposition.
(3) Joinder.
The "fund doctrine" only applies where the holder of a subro-
gated right does not become a party to the lawsuit.
The majority rule appears to be that the subrogated insurer or pre-
paid medical expense plan must respond and compensate its insured's
costs (including attorney's fees) when the insured's efforts have resulted
in recovery from the tortfeasor.' 21 However, the amount which the in-
sured's attorney is to be compensated-or the amount of reimburse-
ment is not dependent on the contract between the insured and the
attorney, but is to be a reasonable amount for the services rendered.1 22
The court rejected the "proportionate share" award of the trial court,
stating that this type of "measuring stick" makes the agreement between
the insured andhis attorney the sole determinative of the "reasonable-
ness" of the fee. Therefore, the court -remanded the action to the trial
court to take testimony and determine what a reasonable fee would be
based upon all of the circumstances keeping the following in mind:
(1) Nature of the contract with the insured;
(2) Amount of services rendered; and
(3) Degree of difficulty of establishing liability.
The reasonable fee doctrine does not necessarily mean that in all
circumstances the contingent fee percentage agreed upon by the insured
and his attorney cannot be used as the measure of a proper fee for the
attorney to receive from the insurer. Canon 13 of the American Bar
Association's Canons of Professional Ethics' 23 points out that a con-
tingent fee should be reasonable and that its reasonableness should be
subject to the supervision of a court. The insurer's claim carries the
same risk of uncertainty as the insured's claim. Therefore, it would
seem that where the court approves the contingent fee agreed upon by
121 E.G., Brown v. T. W. Phillips Bas and Oil Co., 105 F. Supp. 479 (D.C. Pa.
1962); Krause v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 184 Neb. 588, 169 N.W.2d
601 (1969), aff'd on rehearing, 184 Neb. 639, 170 N.W.2d 882 (1969).
122State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Geline, 48 Wis. 2d 290, 179 N.W.2d 813.
123 Aar. Juo. 2d, Desk Book, p. 226 (1962).
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the attorney and the insured, the same fee would be reasonable as to the
insurer."19 An argument could be made that proving the special damages
for medical expense takes less imagination and talent than obtaining a
large award for pain, suffering and permanent disability.
However, since the insurer is, for all practical purposes, bound by
the choice the insured makes in selecting his attorney, and is unable to
enter as a participant in the negotiations for the fee to be charged, the
court may be reluctant to 'bind the insurer to return to the attorney the
same percentage of its recovery which the insured has agreed to re-
turn.121 Canon 12 of the Canons of Ethics cites the following as factors
to be considered in determining the amount of an attorney's fees:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved and the skill requisite properly to conduct
the cause;
(2) Whether the acceptance of employment in the particular
case will preclude the lawyer's appearance for others in
cases likely to arise out of the transaction and in which
there is a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would
be employed, or will involve the loss of other employment
while employed in the particular case or antagonisms with
other clients;
(3) The customary charges of the Bar for similar services;
(4) The amount involved in .the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client from the services;
(5) The contingency or the certainty of the compensation; and
(6) The character of the employment whether casual or for an
established and constant client.
12 5
VI. DIVISION OF PROCEEDS WHERE MULTIPLE SUBROGATED
INSURERS SEEK RECOVERY
A particularly difficult problem is presented when a number of sub-
rogated insurers seek recovery from the proceeds of a personal injury
settlement or judgment. Although the situation occurs frequently, there
are as yet no reported decisions.
The typical case involves a claimant in a personal injury accident
who is employed 'by a manufacturer with a health and accident insurance
contract for medical expenses containing a subrogation clause. The
claimant also has a medical payments clause in his own liability insur-
ance contract so that he becomes entitled to payment for his medical
expenses both from the health and accident insurer and his liability
-4 See United Services Auto Assoc. v. Hills, 172 Neb. 128, 199 N.W.2d 174
(1961).
12z AAi. Ju.L 2d, Desk Book, p. 225 ((1962). Counsel for AHS had proposed prior
to the new trial, that these factors be determining. However, AHS settled
with Mr. Geline prior to trial. State Farm took an interesting approach rather
than return to the trial court which had already held a "reasonable" fee
would be 1/3 of the subrogation claims. State Farm and Geline submitted
their dispute to a panel of three arbitrators picked by the Milwaukee County
Bar Association.
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insurer under its medical payments provisions. Assume $1,000 in
medical expenses for which claimant receives a check from his H & A
carrier, and a check from the medical payments insurer. He sub-
sequently obtains a $10,000 recovery from the negligent tortfeasor's
insurer and both the H & A carrier and medical payments carrier
demand reimbursement under their respective subrogation clauses.
Obviously, of the $10,000 recovery from the liability insurer of the
negligent tortfeasor, only $1,000 is attributable to the medical expense
for which the claimant has already been reimbursed twice. Is each sub-
rogated insurer entitled to its $1,000 back or should the subrogated
insurers divide the $1,000 attributable to the medical expenses? The
problem becomes even more involved where the claimant has paid some
medical expenses himself due to limitations in the respective first party
contracts or a claim that the treatment was not reasonable or necessary.
There are no reported cases but the answer to the division of pro-
ceeds between the first party insurers probably turns on the particular
theory on which the state permits subrogation recovery. As indicated
in Appendix A, many states proceed on the theory that denying a double
recovery to a claimant is a fair and equitable result. While it is true a
claimant should be able to contract for such recovery should he so
desire, having contracted for first party coverage with two insurers
where both include a subrogation clause, claimant should be held to his
negotiated agreement and the subrogated insurers should both be
entitled to recover.
On the other hand, in those states that proceed on a strict assign-
able interest theory (or some deviation thereof), the assignment would
only be for the proceeds of the medical expenses, and therefore, since
they are recoverable but once from the negligent tortfeasor's insurer,
the recovery should be divided pro rata between the subrogated insurers.
As to those states whose theory of permitting subrogation recoveries
presents a highbred or combination of reasons, no firm or fixed answer
to the problem can be suggested.
VII. MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
There are miscellaneous practical problems related to subrogation
clauses where the amounts involved seldom justify litigation but where
the ingenuity of claimants and counsel presents some fascinating
theoretical problems.
Certainly no subrogation clause can be intelligently administered or
enforced by an insurer without an accompanying obligation on the in-
sured to cooperate with his insurer. Where the insured can profit from
some form of non-cooperation, however, peculiar results follow.
In almost all the states a husband is primarily responsible for
medical expenses of his wife incurred in a personal injury accident. In
1971]
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most of the states, however, a wife can make herself primarily liable by
indicating, at the time of admission for treatment, that she will assume
primary liability. This can make quite a difference.
The case of a husband, employed by a manufacturer with a health
and accident insurance contract providing coverage to the husband and
his dependents, whose wife is seriously injured when the vehicle her
husband is driving leaves the highway and strikes a tree will serve as
an example. In those states that do not bar guests' actions against
their host, or a wife's action against her husband, it is clear that the
wife has a personal injury claim against her husband for pain, suffer-
ing and permanent disability. But what about the medical expenses? If
the wife upon entry to the hospital and upon receiving treatment from
the physician indicates she will become primarily liable, she thereby
creates a claim for the medical and hospital expenses in herself. In this
manner she can proceed against her husband's liability insurer for those
expenses whereas they would otherwise be the husband's claim and
would be extinguished by his being the sole tortfeasor.
What happens, however, where the wife is insured through her
place of employment and that insurer pays the medical expenses on her
behalf. Does that fact represent an assumption by her (actually her
subrogated insurer) of primary liability for the hospital expenses there-
by entitling her subrogation insurer t6 collect from the liability carrier
of the husband? This is a frequently raised question especially where
the wife is unconscious upon her arrival at the hospital. This problem
has become more common as additional women have entered the work
force and have acquired the same fringe benefits as their husbands.
Another common problem arises when a minor plaintiff is injured
and the adverse liability insurer negotiates a settlement with the plain-
tiff and his father, who is by law primarily responsible for the injured
child's medical expenses. Many settlements are negotiated on the basis
of the top dollar going to the injured minor with a very minimal
amount awarded (with court approval) to the injured child's father for
ultimate theoretical distribution to the subrogation insurer. Certainly
that insurer has the right to proceed independently but as a practical
matter its chances of success are negligible in a close case where its sub-
rogation claim is not presented along with the claim for personal in-
juries and permanent disability of the injured child. The number of
court orders entered in minor court settlements practically closing out
the rights of subrogated insurers to the medical expenses are almost
limitless.
[Vol. 54
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